Congo's war and what Canada is or isn't doing to help

The question that I was asked was "Given the scale and nature of the conflict in the D.R. Congo, is there any evidence Canadian foreign policy still operates on the human security agenda?"

Before I can answer this question I have to know A) the origin and the nature of the conflict in the DR Congo, as well as B) what has been Canada's foreign policy towards it?

A. Origin and Nature of the Conflict in the DR Congo

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) is a huge country, the size of Western Europe, and with a population of more than 68 million. It is the richest country in Africa in terms of natural resources: diamonds, cobalt, tin, chromium, gold, coltan (used in mobile phones), copper, zinc, cassiterite, oil, gas and timber. Yet its citizens are the poorest in the world. There are very few roads or railways and the health and educational system lie in ruins. It also has the distinction of having the large number of people (about 5 million) to die from war since the 1940s and a nation that has seen, and is seeing, terrible atrocities committed against it in the last 124 years. Even a few days ago, a UN representative called the DR Congo “the rape capital of the world”(1) and quoted that more than 8000 women were raped during fighting in the eastern part in 2009.To understand how and why these terrible things are, and have happened, I will try to give a very simplified summary of a very complex, bloody and difficult history which did not just begin with the Congo War in the 1990s and 2000s but earlier because DR Congo was a much weaken country before.

1. Belgium Involvement

In 1877, the American correspondent Henry M. Stanley navigated the Congo River and opened the interior, which included the country of DR Congo, to exploration. He was commissioned by King Leopold II of the Belgium to make treaties with native chiefs. This enabled the king to obtain personal title to the territory in 1885. During his reign he accumulated a vast personal fortune from ivory and rubber from the DR Congo through slave labor. About ten million people are estimated to have died from forced labor, starvation, and extermination. In 1908 following pressure from the 20th century’s first international human rights movement, Leopold sold his control to Belgium who took over administration of the country. Forced labour continued in the DR Congo. In 1935, the Belgian government made it mandatory that all civilians must do 60 days of compulsory labour per year. Later after strikes to protest this practice by the workers, this number was changed to 120 days in 1942. The DR Congo remained a colony until riots for independence forced Belgium to grant it independence on June 30, 1960. But before that happened, Belgium emptied the DR Congo’s treasury and transferred the debt to the new government.

2. Independence

Within weeks after independence, two of the provinces seceded from the new republic. One of the movements was supported by the Belgians for it removed the rich copper area from the DR Congo. The new government asked the UN for assistance and to remove Belgian soldiers and other foreign mercenaries. The UN authorized its first peacekeeping mission in Africa.
The president staged an army coup in 1960 and handed the prime minister over to the forces of one of the provinces that had seceded. A UN investigating commission found that the prime minister had been killed by a Belgian mercenary in the presence of Tshombe, the leader of one of the seceded provinces. In 1962 Tshombe rejected a national reconciliation plan submitted by the UN. His troops fired on the UN force in December, and in the ensuing conflict Tshombe was defeated on Jan. 14, 1963. The peacekeeping force withdrew, and in order to fight a spreading rebellion the president named Tshombe as premier. Tshombe used foreign mercenaries, and Belgian paratroops airlifted by U.S. planes, to defeat a Communist-backed regime in the northeast of the DR Congo. In 1965 the president dismissed Tshombe. Later the president himself was ousted by the army. Gen. Joseph-Desiré Mobutu, became the new president. He nationalized the Belgian copper mines, eliminated opposition by hanging some opponents to win the election, nationalized much of the economy, barred religious instruction in schools, and decreed the adoption of African names. It was one of the world’s most corrupt regimes. His disastrous policies put the country into economic collapse while he kept billions for himself, his family and friends. In 1971 he gained support and huge financial assistance from the US because he sided with them during the Cold War by allowing them to use his country as a base against the Soviet-backed Angola. In 1977, invaders from Angola pushed into the country and threatened an important mining center. France and Belgium provided military aid to defeat the rebels. In 1991, the Cold War was over, and Mobutu was forced to allow multiparty democracy. In 1992 a transitional government was appointed with Mobutu as a president who held a great deal of power.

3. War

In April 1994, the Hutu extremist government of Rwanda, a neighbouring country of DR Congo, killed about 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu in Rwanda. This resulted in the Tutsi rebels taking control of Rwanda and the exile of about one million Hutu into camps in DR Congo. Four months later, about 50,000 people died of cholera in these camps. By November 1994, aid agencies refused to work in these camps because the former Rwanda Hutu soldiers had taken control of them.
In November 1996, the Rwandan army with support of an anti-Mobutu rebel group led by Kabila, attacked the camps and marched on the capital. Many Rwandan Hutu refugees flee and were slaughtered. Later the UN tried to determine if gross human rights violations and possibly genocide took place, but they were not successful. Mobutu was ousted by May 1997. But joy over Mobutu's downfall disappeared as Kabila's, the new president’s, autocratic style came out. He seemed to completely lack a plan for rebuilding the country. In August 1998, Kabila demanded that the Rwandan army leave DR Congo and removed Tutsi from his government. Rwanda and Uganda invaded and took control of a large portion of the country. Kabila got support from Angolan, Namibian, and Zimbabwean troops and repelled an attack to take the capital. The invaders remained in control of a large part of the east. The fighting continued and the Rwanda Hutu from the refugee camp joined Kabila’s side.
In 1999, after one year of fighting, a ceasefire agreement was signed in Lusaka, Zambia, by the armies of the six countries involved and some rebel groups. It failed to halt the fighting. Three months later the UN established another peacekeeping mission and requested 500 military observers to monitor the ceasefire agreement. Three months later, fighting continued and the UN mission expanded to include 5,537 peacekeeper troops. The mandate was weak and fighting continued.
In June 2000, the UN investigated reports of the illegal exploitation of mineral wealth and its link with the ongoing war in the DR Congo. Later the UN found that the DR Congo war had evolved into a conflict for access and control of minerals. It recommended sanctions against military officials and involved companies but no action was taken. Another UN investigation had concluded that the armies of Uganda and Rwanda, both, committed war crimes and must pay reparation. No action was made by either governments. At the same time, the International Rescue Committee estimated that more than 1.7 million people had died in the east part of the country during the last two years because of the war. One year later, it found that the total death toll had increased to 2.5 million with large losses among children.
In January, 2001, Kabila was assassinated. His son, Joseph, became the new president.
In June 2002, the Human Rights Watch documented the first time the widespread use of rape as a weapon of war in DR Congo. A few months later, 3000 people were killed when rival militias clashed. Rwanda pulled out 20,000 troops from the DR Congo after pressure from the international community and an agreement to disarm the Rwandan Hutu rebels, who committed genocide. The UN increased the number of peacekeeping troops to 8,600.
In October 2002, the UN concluded that the withdrawal of foreign troops would not curb illegal exploitation of mineral wealth since there was already an “elite criminal network.” (2) They listed 85 international companies.
The president wanted to end the civil war. He agreed to a power-sharing arrangement with Ugandan-supported rebels and signed a peace accord with Rwanda and Uganda. Seven foreign armies and numerous rebel groups that often fought among themselves were involved in this bloody war. This transitional government had the same president with four vice-presidents-2 of them former Rwandan-backed rebels. It was sworn in July 2003 and democratic elections were to take place in 2 years.
In May 2003, Uganda became the last foreign government to withdraw its troops. This created a vacuum of power and started inter-ethnic fighting in the northeast part. Thousands of civilians were killed in the ethnic cleansing. One month later EU troops were deployed to the region at the request of the UN to protect civilians and support UN peacekeepers. The mandate of the UN peacekeepers was changed to permit the use of force to protect civilians at risk. Their number increases to 10,500.

4.Transitional Government

In October 2003 the UN published a final report that “the plunder of Congo’s mineral wealth is likely to continue to fuel conflict and cause immense human suffering if national and international measures to curb it are not put in place.” (3) It recommended the investigation of 33 companies but no resolutions were passed.
The government requested the International Criminal Court to investigate crimes committed since 2002. One year later arrest warrants were issued for 5 leaders of the Uganda n rebel group for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Uganda. Two years later the court found that Uganda has committed human right violations against the DR Congo and had been illegally plundering resources from the Congo between 1998 and 2003. Compensation had been ordered but Uganda failed to comply. Later the court decided that they had no jurisdiction to rule on crimes committed by Rwanda in the DR Congo. There was an arrest warrant issued for Thomas Lubanga for the war crime of recruiting and using children soldiers. He became the first indictee in custody for the DR Congo’s atrocities. Later more people were arrested. In January 2009 the first trial began in The Hague against Lubanga.
In May 2004, the UN investigated claims of sexual exploitation abuses by its peacekeepers which later turned out to be true. At the same time, a Tutsi renegade general with support from Rwanda took control of a town in the eastern part. UN peacekeepers were unable to halt their advance. Eventually they withdraw but the people of the DR Congo were angry that the UN peacekeepers failed to act and they attacked the UN staff. In October 2004 an additional 5,900 UN troops were authorized.
The death toll in the DR Congo continued to climb to 3.9 million deaths, with the majority due to lack of medicine and malnutrition.
In August 2004, 160 Tutsi from the Congo who lived in a refugee camp in Burundi were killed by Hutu guerrillas from Burundi.
Early in 2005, the governments appointed 5 former warloads with terrible records of human rights abuses as generals in the government’s army. This occurred again in October 2006 with the appointment of more warlords-one who was found responsible for the murder and hostage taking of UN peacekeepers. A month later, nine UN peacekeepers were killed by militias in eastern DR Congo. Later a Uganda rebel group moved into northern part of the Congo. The Uganda government threatened to invade the DR Congo to get at the rebel group. More UN peacekeepers were called in, bringing the number to 17,000-the largest UN peacekeeping mission. One month later, the Congo army battled with a Mai Mai commander and his group in the south of the country. This continued until May 2006 when the Mai Mai leader surrendered. Both sides committed terrible atrocities. In the following months more peacekeepers were killed or kidnapped.

In December 2005 a new constitution was passed by public referendum making way for elections, which had not been held yet. However, “slow candidate registration , political wrangling and continued fighting in the east” (4) postponed the elections. The UN authorized the temporary deployment of 2000 soldiers from the EU force to help UN peacekeepers with the election. They were there until November 2006. Campaigning began in June 2006 with 33 candidates for president and ended one month later. Seventy percent of the voters came out. However of the two top contenders, President Kabila and Vice President Bemba, neither had 50%, and a run-off vote was needed. However before the run-off vote, Kabila ordered the military into the province where Bemba, his election opponent, lived. At his home, there was an exchange of fire and 23 people were killed. Bemba and 14 other diplomats were rescued by UN peacekeepers. Top UN officials withheld publishing a report on this incident. After the election, Bemba publically accused Kabila of corruption and trying to kill him.
In August 2006 rebel troops clashed with the government army in the eastern part of the country. The rebels gained control of this part. In November they clashed again and gained more. Later the UN peacekeepers were able to push them back.
In October 2006 a run-off vote was held with Kabila winning. Tensions remained high. Kabila was sworn in December 2006.

5.New Government

In January 2007, secret negotiations were underway to integrate rebel troops from the east into the army. They were successful initially but problems occurred and eventually it failed. They returned as a more powerful rebel group backed by Rwanda. In August 2007, there was more fighting between this group and the army. 200,000 people fled their home because of the fighting.
In January 2007, one hundred supporters of a political religious who were allied with Bemba, protested the election results and were killed by police and soldiers. Only a few countries denounced this act. Political leaders from the DR Congo hampered the investigation.
In March 2007, Bemba’s security guards refused to join the army. Kabila launched an attack on them and Bemba. There was heavy fighting for three days in the capital. Hundreds of civilians were killed. Bemba fled to the South American embassy. His headquarters were destroyed and hundreds of his supporters were arrested and tortured. One hundred and fifty were executed. Bemba with UN peacekeepers help fled the country. Many more of his supporters were arrested.
In September 2007, key donor countries were concerned that the situation in eastern Congo was deteriorating. However China signed a 9 billion dollar deal for mineral rights for copper and cobalt.
In November 2007 fighting continued in the east. An army offensive with UN peacekeeper support against the rebels resulted in a defeat. Many men in the army deserted. However, the rebel leader called for peace talks.
In January 2008, a peace conference was organized and three weeks later a peace deal was signed by 22 armed rebel groups and the government.
In March 2008, over 200 people were killed in a second government crackdown of the political religious group which supported Bemba. Soldiers hide the bodies in the river to hide the attack.
By June 2008, the peace deal has started to unravel with some of the rebel groups. There were clashes which resulted in more displaced civilians.
In August 2008 the British government found that two British companies had contributed to the conflict in the DR Congo and to human rights abuses. However no criminal charges were brought forward.
In September 2008, in the north government troops clashed with rebels. The rebels responded by killing 160 people and abducting 300 children.. Other rebels a month later captured a military base and took a large amount of weapons. The government blamed the UN peacekeepers for allowing it to happen and turned public opinion against them. Rebels also captured several towns. There were many men deserting the army in these areas. This resulted in looting and raping. Rwanda got involved and called off the rebel advance. The rebels wanted peace talks with the government again. However in November, the same rebels killed 150 people in a town one kilometer away from a UN peacekeeper base. Thousands fled. The situation was getting worst. The UN appointed a special envoy and met with regional and international leaders for crisis talks. It also authorized another 3000 peacekeepers but no country initially came forward. EU troops were also requested for eastern Congo but EU refused, as did other African countries.
December 2008, troops from the Congo, Southern Sudan and Uganda with American support launched an attack on rebel bases. The rebels killed more than 800 civilians and displaced tens of thousands. In the months that followed Rwanda Hutu militia and other rebel groups also continued attacking, killing hundreds of civilians and displacing many more.
In March 2009, the government signed a peace agreement with a group of rebels and accepted the group as a political party. Most of the Uganda troops withdrew from the northern part while the UN agreed to support the army in continuing operations against the rebel groups. Also the UN peacekeepers adopted a strategy to combat sexual violence in DR Congo. While the IMF gave an emergency $200 million loan to pay salaries of soldiers and other civil servants.
In April 2009, the UN peacekeepers and the army launched attacks on rebels in South Kivu. More civilians are killed, displaced from their homes. Looting and rape occurred by unpaid deserting soldiers, many of whom are from rebel groups.
In May 2009, the government passed an amnesty law for rebel militias in certain areas however no amnesty for crimes against humanity or war crimes. Fighting by other rebel groups continued and there was a huge increase in human rights abuses by rebel combatants and the army reported. Later a policy of “zero tolerance” (5)for human rights abuse and rape by the soldiers was announced by the government. In June 2009, the president claimed that peace had arrived in the eastern part of the country however this was not so, fighting continues to this day. In June 2009, Bemba was ordered to stand trial by the International Criminal Court for war crimes by his soldiers between 2002 and 2003.

In December of 2009, rebels in the east killed 321 and abducted 250 including 80 children in and isolated area. During the last year from May 2009 to May 2010, rebel insurgencies continue in the east. Aid group say that the army is responsible for many atrocities.
In April of this year 8 aid workers were abducted by a rebel group in the east. They were released about a week later.
The UN peacekeeper’s mandate is coming to an end shortly. A complete withdrawal is not on the table. However, the UN is resisting pressure from the president to start pulling out by June 30th, the 50th anniversary of independence. Reports are that 2,000 of the 20,500 peacekeepers may be withdrawn. The president states that his forces will take over from the UN peacekeepers. However many civilians fear the army because of the past atrocities that they have committed.
In the east around the city of Goma, reports are that the city is safer than last year. Operations with the UN and army have flushed out rebels across the region. Disarmament efforts have drawn out soldiers out of the jungle and the militias has been weakened. However in the vast territory outside of Goma there is still an active presence of violent armed militias. Many in the Rwandan rebel group which were involved in the Rwandan genocide in 1994, are still active in the eastern part of the DR Congo and it remains a “no-go zone.” (6) Fears are that once the UN peacekeepers leave the whole country will be a “no-go zone.” (6)
- http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/08/20/dr-congo-chronology-key-events?print
- Coltan and the congo by Gordon Setter
- http://www.theglobeandmail.com/subscribe.jsp?art=1513795
- http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8650112.stm?...



B. Canada's foreign policy towards the D.R. Congo/Canada’s Involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Canada’s history with the Democratic Republic of Congo dates back to 1960. At that time Canada’s Prime Minister John Diefenbaker sent 421 soldiers to support the UN peacekeepers. Their mission was to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces from the DR Congo and to assist the new independent government to maintaining law and order. The mission ended in 1964 and what followed, was many decades of political strife and regional violence. Some believe that Canada went there with no aim, no preparation, no logistics or intelligence capability and they accomplished nothing. A recent article by Kevin Spooner assesses the significance of Canada’s role in the Congo in 1960 and its foreign policy. The government’s foreign policy followed that it was important to achieve Western objectives rather than follow the Cold War views of some of the NATO allies.

Since the 60s the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has provided bilateral development assistance which has been “on good governance, rehabilitation of basic social and economic services, support for peace and security initiatives, and promotion of human rights.” (7) The programmes are mainly on equality of sexes and human rights especially against sexual violence. Also significant support has been given to humanitarian assistance, through UN agencies and non-governmental agencies. Some of the projects that Canada has helped is to educate the people of Congo for their first election in 40 years. CIDA also helps support the Central Bank with their human resources management resources and CIDA also helps with primary health service and infrastructure in some rural areas. In 2007 to 2008 CIDA contributions have been $30.78 millions.

Canada has supported the UN peacekeepers through contributions to its budget and there are a few Canadian military personnel (in 2008 it was 11). Canada in 2003, only sent two aircrafts and fifty troops. According to an article by Lang and Morse in April, 2010, these people have said that the situation in the DR Congo is a “quagmire” (8) politically, militarily and geographically over a huge area. They tell that there is a need for “major heliborne light infantry capacity because the roads are practically impassable.” (8) Also the enemy is “multiplex, volatile and mercurial.” (8)
In 1996 Canada proposed to lead an international force of about 10,000 to 15,000 ground troops, into the eastern part to bring in food and protection to the many refugees displaced by fighting. But it was cancelled when the United States disapproved the plan. They thought that the “foreign venture into a chaotic landscape of rival militias and endangered refugees could end in disaster.” (9)
In 2003, 2008 and 2010 Canada has been asked by the UN to join and to lead the mission. In 2003 and 2008 it was refused. Now, it was expected that Canadian General Andrew Leslie would take over the command and bring with him about 100 top officers however in the last few days this does not appear to be happening. Canada’s mission in Afghanistan is set to begin pulling out in mid-2011 and it is hoped by some that Canada’s troops will be sent to the DR Congo. A few weeks ago Governor General Michaelle Jean was in the DR Congo to focus on the problems there. As well, there has been more press coverage on Canada needing to get involved. One example is Lt.-Gen. Romeo A. Dallaire and his articles in the newspapers and his interviews on the radio. Up to this point, the DR Congo crisis was little known in Canada.

Canada has also been involved in the DR Congo with trade in a limited way. However in 2008, it was listed as the largest non-African investor in mining. Accusations have been mining has gone on in the most violent area but the richest mineral area by International Panorama Resources [a Vancouver-based mining company] and it was being protected by Uganda. Ten other Canadian companies were implicated in a UN report on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources in 2002. None were investigated in their role in the war.Overall Canada is not pulling its weight around peacekeeping wise but Canada has been giving aid and trying to stop the problem through the government and NGO’s.

- http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/Canada+should+Congo/2751309/story.html
- http://www.ottawacitizen.com/story_print.html?id=2759979&sponsor= -
-http://www.dominionpaper.ca/articles/1177
- http://acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/Eng/JUD-12413358-PT3
-http://ejournals.library.Ualberta.ca/index.php/cjas-rcea/article/viewArticle/6909
-http://www.thestar.com/printarticle/798458
-http://www.nytimes.com/1996/11/13/world/canada-proposes-zaire-aid-force.html?sec=&sp...

C. My answer to question "Given the scale and nature of the conflict in the DR Congo, is there any evidence Canadian foreign policy still operates on the human security agenda?"

Based on the scale and nature of the conflict in the DR Congo, as noted in the previous sections, if Canada’s foreign policy was operating on the human security agenda than being involved in the DR Congo would be Canada’s Number One Priority. As it is not Canada’s priority, than one can safely say that it is not the dominant, driving force of our foreign policy. Also if it was, we would not be seeing headlines such as these ones:

1. Article in the Ottawa Citizen by Lt. Gen. Romeo A. Dallaire and Paul Dewar on April 29, 2010:
“Canada must intervene
We have too long ceded our position of leadership in fighting crimes against humanity: Canada has a responsibility to act in Congo”

2. Article in Toronto Star by Tonda MacCharles on April 21, 2010:
“UN asks Canada for help in the Congo”

3. Article in Ottawa Citizen by Elizabeth Payne on April 3, 2010:
“Canada should be in Congo”

So, just as with East Timor the human security agenda cannot be applied to Canada’s foreign policy as its central theme. It has proven to be too vague and broad to be meaningful to foreign policy. It involves a large range of different threats to human safety and a diverse and different set of policy solutions to resolve the threats. The commitment by Canada would be very large and one which we could not deliver on because of many reasons, such as political, economically, geographical, etc. Therefore East Timor experience of 1999 and the terrible conflict in DR Congo have shown that the human security agenda cannot be applied to Canada’s foreign policy as its central policy.

However, Canada does contribute in a relative minor way through CIDA for the programmes of the Bilateral Humanitarian Assistance as mentioned in the previous section, and providing small numbers of military personnel (a few hundred all together over several years). CIDA’s budget was about 5 billion dollars in 2008. DR Congo received about 30 million (0.6%). This was slightly less than what China, a very successful country who the US is borrowing huge amounts of money from and who are owners of the consumer world, received that year. DR Congo only received about 1.2 % of the total African contribution from CIDA. Small contributions from a country that was the leading proponent for human security agenda before!!!!!!

- http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/acdi-cida.nsf/eng/JUD-4128122-G4W

Quotes taken from
(1) BBC News. 2010. "DR Congo is world "rape capital" http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8650112.stm?

(2) Focus On UN Panel Report On the Plunder of the Congo.
21 October 2002 http://allafrica.com/stories/200210210335.html

(3) Human Rights Watch. 2009. DR Congo:Chronology. http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/08/20/dr-congo-chronology-key-events

(4)Human Rights Watch. 2009. DR Congo:Chronology. http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/08/20/dr-congo-chronology-key-events

(5)Human Rights Watch. 2009. DR Congo:Chronology. http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/08/20/dr-congo-chronology-key-events

(6)MacCharles, T., 2010. UN asks Canada for help in the Congo. http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/article/798458--un-askscanada-for-help-in-the-congo

(7) Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) 2009. Democratic Republic of Congo. http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/acdi-cida.nsf/eng/JUD-12413358-PT3

(8) Lang, E. and E. Morse. 2010. Out of the frying pan. http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/frying/2759979/story.html

(9) Crossette, B. 1996. Canada Proposes Zaire Aid Force.http://www.nytimes.com/1996/11/13/world/canada-proposes-zaire-aid-force.html?sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all

The Human Security Agenda in Canadian Foreign Policy Too Idealist to be Practical

The Human Security Agenda in Canadian Foreign Policy Too Idealist to be Practical

After the experience of East Timor, one can say that the human security agenda “Safety for People” cannot provide a viable foundation for Canadian foreign policy, even though Canada was a foremost proponent in the 1990s.



In the mid 1990s the Canadian government embraced the human security agenda. In Canada, it was largely driven by one man, Lloyd Axworthy, Canada’s foreign minister from 1996 to 2000 who appears to be more idealistic than practical. It was a great idea but it cannot be implemented, as was shown in the East Timor experience. Talk is cheap but putting it into action is a totally different picture. There was a huge gap between human security agenda and Canada’s actual policy and response to the violence in East Timor in September 1999. Eventually, two long months after the start of the violence Canada did respond by sending by sending a small group of 250 infantry men to the international forces. Canada's response was cautious, slow and small.

The East Timor experience demonstrated very well the limitations of the human security agenda and why it cannot provide a viable foundation for Canadian foreign policy. These limitations were:



1. It showed that there was no real Canadian interest, willingness nor capacity in ending the threat to the safety of citizen of East Timor, a land about 640 kilometers northwest of Australia, with a population of about 1 million people. Only a token/symbolic contribution was sent. This could also have been due to the fact that Canada had large economic interests in Indonesia,a population of 230 million, and did not want to annoy Indonesia. About one third of a billion dollars in military sales had been approved by the Canadian Prime Minister to Indonesia over 5 years.



Australia was more actively involved than Canada because of the proximity and also because there is oil and gas off the coast of East Timor, which Australia now shares with East Timor in its development.



Canada may have been pushed into activity by public opinion, media attention of the violence and lobbyists lobbying the government and educating the public. Non government organizations had been in East Timor since the middle of the 1970s. In a true human security agenda this should not be a driving force for action.



Also the prime minister did not want to use force as a tool of foreign policy unless there was a high level of public support, such as in Kosovo in 1999 and in Afghanistan in 2002. The prime minister felt that fighting in East Timor for human security would not be an acceptable political opinion of many Canadians. Canada was a well known peacekeeper nation not involved in active combat. It was felt that Canadians would not want Canadian troops in harm’s way. Different governments would give different reactions. Chretien also allowed the defence budget to decrease in the 1990s leaving a huge gap between Canada’s commitments and the capabilities of the Canadian Forces.



2. It showed that if the human security agenda was taken seriously in foreign policy by Canada then Canada should have been organized to implement its commitments. However the East Timor experience showed it was not. Prime Minister Jean Chretien, Minister of Finance Paul Martin, and Minister of National Defence did not buy into the human security agenda of sending a strong expedition to Timor, as Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy would have wanted. Also there was no forward planning in Canada for the possibility that the East Timor vote on autonomy might be marked by violence even though intelligence reports stated there could be. Canada was not ready for the violence.



In a world where the west, including Canada, is mostly Realpolitik instead of Moralpolitik, this agenda would seem to be in conflict with the west’s way. According to students, Canada would have to become an imperialist boyscout to have the human security agenda in its foreign policy. I think it might be a good idea but we need to look out for ourselves first. (Sorry my Realpolitik is showing!)



Canada's foreign policy needs to be something universal that all four parties can agree on and live with. It needs to be something that is morally sound for us and at the same time making sure it is a safe move for Canada. Once we have such a plan that is more universal than it shall be easier to use and work.




Overall it can be stated that the East Timor situation of 1999 showed that the human security agenda can offer a useful analytical tool but it cannot be useful for foreign policy in Canada. This is because human security is too vague and broad to be meaningful to foreign policy. It involves a large range of different threats to human safety and a diverse and different set of policy solutions to resolve the threats. Also even if human security perspective was narrowed, the commitment by Canada would still be a very large one and one which we could not deliver on because of many reasons, such as political, economically, etc. Therefore East Timor experience of 1999 has shown that the human security agenda could not be applied to Canada’s foreign policy, especially in light of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The Canada government has dropped human security as a central theme of its foreign policy.


Info from
T.S. Hataley & Kim Richard Nossal, " The Limits of the Human Security Agenda: The Case of Canada's Response to the Timor Crisis,"Global Change,Peace & Security( Vol.16,No.1.February 2004),pp.5-17